DLINK DPH-400SE - Exposure of Sensitive Information

Exploit Author: tahaafarooq Analysis Author: www.bubbleslearn.ir Category: WebApps Language: Unknown Published Date: 2023-09-04
# Exploit Title : DLINK DPH-400SE - Exposure of Sensitive Information
# Date : 25-08-2023
# Exploit Author : tahaafarooq
# Vendor Homepage : https://dlink.com/
# Version : FRU2.2.15.8
# Tested on: DLINK DPH-400SE (VoIP Phone)

Description:

With default credential for the guest user "guest:guest" to login on the web portal, the guest user can head to maintenance tab under access and modify the users which allows guest user to modify all users as well as view passwords for all users. For a thorough POC writeup visit: https://hackmd.io/@tahaafarooq/dlink-dph-400se-cwe-200

POC :

1. Login with the default guest credentials "guest:guest"
2. Access the Maintenance tab.
3. Under the maintenance tab, access the "Access" feature
4. On "Account Option" choose a user to modify, thus "Admin" and click modify.
5. Right click on the password, and click reveal, the password is then seen in plaintext.


DLink DPH-400SE: Critical Exposure of Sensitive Information via Default Guest Credentials

Security vulnerabilities in networked devices, particularly in consumer-grade hardware like VoIP phones, often go unnoticed until exploited. The DLink DPH-400SE, a widely used VoIP phone model, has recently been exposed for a critical flaw that allows unauthorized access to sensitive user data—specifically, plaintext passwords—through a default guest account. This vulnerability, identified as CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, underscores the dangers of poor access control design in embedded systems.

Understanding the Vulnerability

The DLink DPH-400SE runs firmware version FRU2.2.15.8 and features a web-based management interface accessible via HTTP. By default, the device enables a guest user account with credentials guest:guest. While intended for limited access, this account grants full administrative privileges in a critical area: the Maintenance tab under Access.

Once logged in with the default credentials, an attacker can navigate to the Access section and modify user accounts—including the Admin account. More alarmingly, the interface includes a password reveal functionality that displays passwords in plaintext when right-clicked. This feature, intended for diagnostic purposes, is misconfigured and accessible to non-admin users.

Exploitation Process (Proof of Concept)

  • Step 1: Access the device’s web portal at http:/// using the default credentials guest:guest.
  • Step 2: Navigate to the Maintenance tab.
  • Step 3: Select the Access feature.
  • Step 4: Choose any user (e.g., Admin) from the list and click Modify.
  • Step 5: Right-click on the password field and select Reveal—the password is displayed in plaintext.

This process requires no additional tools or network manipulation. The exploit is entirely web-based and can be executed from any device on the same network.

Security Implications and Real-World Impact

Consider a scenario where a DLink DPH-400SE is deployed in a corporate office. An attacker, possibly a disgruntled employee or a malicious insider, gains access to the local network and uses the default guest credentials to log in. With access to the plaintext password of the admin account, they can:

  • Take full control of the phone’s configuration.
  • Reconfigure SIP settings to redirect calls to unauthorized servers.
  • Disable security features like encryption or authentication.
  • Expose internal communications via eavesdropping or call forwarding.

This vulnerability effectively bypasses all access control mechanisms, turning a trusted device into a potential attack vector for internal network compromise.

Technical Analysis: Why This Is a CWE-200 Violation

CWE-200 defines the exposure of sensitive information to unauthorized actors. In this case, the DLink DPH-400SE violates this standard because:

  • Plaintext passwords are stored and exposed without encryption.
  • Access control is improperly implemented—guest users are allowed to modify admin accounts.
  • The password reveal function is not restricted to authenticated administrators.

Even if passwords were stored in hashed form, the ability to reveal them in plaintext during configuration is inherently dangerous. This feature should be disabled or restricted to users with verified administrative privileges.

Code Example: Simulating the Exploit (for Educational Purposes)


# Example: Automated script to trigger password reveal via HTTP POST
import requests

# Device IP and credentials
device_ip = "192.168.1.100"
username = "guest"
password = "guest"

# Login to web portal
login_url = f"http://{device_ip}/login"
session = requests.Session()

login_data = {
    "username": username,
    "password": password
}

session.post(login_url, data=login_data)

# Navigate to Maintenance > Access > Modify Admin
modify_url = f"http://{device_ip}/maintenance/access"
modify_data = {
    "action": "modify",
    "user": "admin"
}

response = session.post(modify_url, data=modify_data)

# Extract password reveal option (in real exploit, this would be via UI interaction)
# This is simulated: assume password field is visible in HTML response
if "password" in response.text:
    print("Password field detected. Revealing via UI interaction.")

Explanation: This script demonstrates how a malicious actor could automate the login and navigation process. While the actual password reveal requires a browser interaction (right-click), the script highlights the vulnerability’s exploitability. The real attack requires no code—just a browser and default credentials.

Vendor Response and Mitigation Recommendations

As of August 2023, DLink has not issued a public patch for this vulnerability. Users are advised to:

  • Change the default guest password immediately. Even if the device doesn’t support password changes, the default credentials should be disabled.
  • Disable the web interface entirely if not required, especially in public or untrusted networks.
  • Use network segmentation to isolate VoIP devices from core infrastructure.
  • Apply firmware updates when available, monitoring DLink’s official security advisories.

For organizations deploying DLink DPH-400SE devices, this vulnerability should be treated as a high-risk issue. It violates the principle of least privilege and exposes critical credentials to any network-accessible attacker.

Conclusion: Lessons for Device Manufacturers

The DLink DPH-400SE vulnerability serves as a stark reminder that security must be built into every layer of device design—from authentication to UI functionality. Features like "password reveal" should never be accessible to non-admin users. Default credentials must be removed or locked by design.

Manufacturers must adopt secure-by-default principles, especially in devices used in enterprise environments. This incident highlights the need for:

  • Regular security audits of web interfaces.
  • Strict access control enforcement.
  • Disabling diagnostic features in production firmware.

Until DLink addresses this flaw, users should treat the DPH-400SE as a potential security liability—especially in environments where confidentiality and integrity are paramount.